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Digital Platform Economy has been aired for its efficiency, innovativeness, and 
disruption of the markets. In this article we discuss the relationship of platforms 
such as Uber and their national equivalents with the limitations of physical 
infrastructure and markets. Our article pinpoints that even though the platforms 
may hold their promise this may not be what the communities need, want or can 
sustain. 
  
We illustrate the unprecedented side-effects of the disruption on the markets 
with Uber in Metropoles of the U.S. The side effects include doubts on safety, 
unfair pay and worsening working conditions, as well as congestion and pollution 
on streets. There after we analyze changing taxi markets in Finland. 
 
The potential remedies to situations where new platform businesses threaten to 
disturb the markets range from privatization of assets, regulative mechanisms to 
local agreements (Ostrom, 1990). 
 
This paper is structured as follows: First, we describe the benefits and arising 
concerns of platforms as experiences on their unforeseen effects are 
accumulating. In the next chapter we use the alternative theories to explain how 
to tackle the problems of externalities, socially undesirable behavior and 
overgrazing the common resources. In Chapter 4, we illustrate the situation with 
Ubers at New York and other metropoles in U.S. In Chapter 5 we analyze the impacts of 
opening of taxi market in Finland. The paper ends with discussion and 
conclusions in Chapter 6. 
 
2 Benefits, complexity and concerns of platforms 
 
Amazon, Facebook, Airbnb, Lyft and Uber are examples of digital platforms 
which have changed the way we work, socialize, create, and share value in the 
economy (Kenney & Zysman, 2016; Sundararajan, 2016). These digital 
platforms, defined here as sociotechnical assemblage of the technology, 
associated organisational processes and standards (de Reuver et al., 2018), have 
been praised for their new innovative business models that may even disrupt the 
current markets and create more consumer surplus with their innovative, 
technology-based business models facilitating multi-sided markets. 
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Multi-sided market is the core concept of platforms. Often the platforms match 
different groups of users, such as buyers and sellers, and can differentiate them 
for capturing better profits, growth prospects, and providing superior or cost-
effective service for the customer. Instead of focusing on profit maximisation in a single 
market, platform owner’s business model primarily aims at serving several user 
groups and tries to find balance between openness and lock-in of customers 
(Ballon & Van Heesvelde, 2011). The customer markets can be defined as 
separate markets for each customer group, or as single market to all customer 
groups with different set of products and services. To estimate the benefits to 
one party using the platform, the platform owner must consider the benefits 
(increase in efficiency and profit) on both sides of the market, i.e. towards the 
customers and partners/suppliers/producers. This is at the core of the 
superiority claims of platforms such as Uber and Airbnb. 
 
Network externality is another important concept related to platforms. Positive 
network externalities mean that the larger number of users on the platform, the 
higher is the perceived or expected utility from using the platform (Katz & 
Shapiro, 1985). This fosters growth and innovation, but complicates the analysis 
of competitive markets, because the utility can vary substantially between the 
segments, depending on their valuation of the expected benefits in the future.  
 
Even though the public discussion many times is about which of the platforms 
will win and dominate the markets, in reality the combination of multi-sided 
markets and positive network effects with risk-seeking venture capital can create 
situations where competitive, oligopolistic and monopolistic markets exist 
simultaneously. In addition, predicting the emergent side effects on the 
environment and vice versa (i.e., indirect externalities), and the dominant market 
structure becomes then almost impossible. It can lead towards tipping markets, 
where one platform dominates the market, either by indirect network effects of 
interdependencies of different customer and supplier groups, or by cross-
subvention of the sub-markets by the platform. On the other hand, it can also 
lead to so-called multi-homing behavior, where customers are not connected with 
one platform of multi-sided markets only, but use other platforms, too. 
 
The literature on platforms also points out the regulatory role of platforms, as 
they create markets of their own. Boudreau and Hagiu (2009), for instance, show 
by case examples, how setting the prices was not enough to assure proper 
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functioning of the multisided platform ecosystem, but required regulation of 
access and interactions by contractual, technical and informational instruments. 
 
3 Governance of Commons 
 
Many of the problems explained in the Chapter 2 stem from self-interested 
behavior, negative externalities or from the changes on the use of resources, 
which the platforms exploit or affect in their business. 
 
The solution usually offered to avoid negative externalities is privatization (Buck, 
1992). We could make clear the property rights and liabilities by making the 
resources private. It is claimed that if one party can establish the property right, 
there will be a bargaining process leading to an agreement in which externalities 
are taken into account. Thereafter it is a matter of finding proper balance of 
regulation of markets and introduction of pricing.  
 
However, in certain circumstances the above solution  is not working, but rather 
creating the tragedy of the commons. tragedy of the commons is illustrated with an 
example originating from Hardin (1968): There is a common village pasture, 
which can support only a limited amount of cattle, but all the villagers are entitled 
to pasture their animals on the field. Each villager benefits from his own animals 
and suffers from the deterioration of the commons when his and others' cattle 
overgraze. In this situation each of them is tempted to add more and more 
animals because he is getting direct benefit from his own animals and bears only 
a share of the costs resulting from overgrazing.  
 
The tragedy of commons is apparent in situations, where property rights cannot 
easily be established (such as with the air, sea, or roads). The usual claim is that 
rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common interests, 
unless the number of individuals is small or unless there is aforementioned 
enforcement of regulation taking place. The premise for such situations is that 
any person, who cannot be excluded from obtaining the benefits of a collective 
good has little incentive to contribute to the joint effort, but to free-ride on the 
effort of the others for self-interest. An extensive literature discusses the effect 
of free riders, concluding that common pool resources would inevitably be 
destroyed because of lack of care (Buck, 1992). To avoid such tragedies of the 
commons the central governments should control common pools of resources 
J. Heikkilä & M. Heikkilä:  
Global service platforms in local markets: case taxi services 885 
 
 
that cannot be appropriated (e.g. most natural resource systems). They can 
intervene in directly through taxes, or directly with controls and regulations, such 
as selling permits, licenses or limiting the use of the common resource pool. 
 
Nobel-prize laureate Ostrom (1990), suggests an alternative solution to govern 
the commons. Continuing the example of the common village pasture, she notes 
that the herders, who use the same meadow year after year, have detailed and 
relatively accurate information about carrying capacity. Thus, they should have 
the best information required for making optimal decisions on the usage of the 
common pasture. The community members can “make a binding contract to commit 
themselves to a cooperative strategy that they themselves will work out.”  And, when they are 
herding their animals, they can observe the behavior of others and report 
contractual infractions.  
 
The outcome of this is in strike contrast with the idea of self-interested behavior 
regulated by central authority: “groups are capable of avoiding the tragedy of the commons 
without requiring top-down regulation” (Ostrom 1990, 2009). Ostrom’s main argument 
is that small, local communities establish rules overtime to avoid overusing 
common resources. Instead, these rules are both economically and ecologically 
sustainable, at least if core conditions listed in Table 1 are met (Ostrom 1990, 
2009).  
 
Table 1. Eight core design principles by Ostrom, 2009 
 
1. Clearly defined boundaries; members know that they belong to a group and why 
do they belong exactly to that group, and what are the limits of the common resource. 
2. Proportional equivalence between benefits and costs; there is a connection 
between earnings and effort, e.g., appropriation of rents is not enough. 
3. Collective choice arrangements; i.e., agreements must be reached in consensus by 
those affected by the agreements. 
4. Monitoring users and condition of the resource; Harmful self-interested, self-
serving behavior can be detected. 
5. Graduated sanctions; Repeated self-serving appropriators are assessed graduated 
sanctions according to seriousness and context of the violation by group members, 
or by officials accountable to these appropriators, or by both. 
6. Fast and fair conflict resolution; Conflicts can be handled without excessive costs, 
locally, and without internal conflicts breaking the group. 
7. Local autonomy; The group is autonomous to manage its own matters without 
external authorities intervening. 
8. Nested enterprises: When the resource is closely connected to a larger social-
ecological system, governance activities are organized in multiple nested layers. 
(Ostrom, 2009) 
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In conclusion, the literature proposes three remedies for the challenges arising 
from non- functioning markets: privatization, regulation or local commitment.  
 
How is this then related with platforms? As the platforms are keen to disrupt 
markets, they exploit the common pool of resources without considering 
overgrazing or indirect negative externalities. Furthermore, they are also keen to 
expand, fueled by venture capital and IT, which means unprecedented spread of 
the services to the new areas, ‘overgrazing’ the local resource pools, and causing 
tragedies of commons. This is evident in metropole areas, where the increase of 
Airbnb is regulated by city councils. Similar challenges are with Uber and Lyft 
due to the increasing evidence on their unanticipated indirect external effects on 
congestion, pollution and diminishing use of public transportation (Erhardt et al, 
2019). 
 
As suggested by the theorists above, the outcome can be highly unpredictable, 
and hence other approaches than the standard means of regulation and 
introduction of pricing mechanisms are in need. This is especially true, when it 
involves the threat of overgrazing common pool resources, or changing the 
status quo of locally agreed and locally committed social arrangements. We 
illustrate the former with examples from metropoles in the U.S. and the latter 
from the deregulation of Finnish taxi markets. 
 
4 Illustrative example of Taxi services in Metropoles of the U.S. 
 
The success story of Uber platform tells about better access to taxi services, both 
in terms of availability of services and average decline in prices. For instance, 
safety and similarity are appreciated by globetrotters, who receive similar service 
in cities all over the world, and safety for the drivers is appreciated in some areas.  
 
In Uber, each driver is expected to own a car used to render the service and the 
drivers are not employed by Uber, but the drivers get paid per gig. There is no 
centralized dispatch service-center, but service requests are automatically 
processed by Uber’s algorithm; drivers can use their smart phones to receive and 
respond the service requests from users by an app. This application also allows 
customers to place orders through it, which also locates customers automatically 
for the driver. Furthermore, customers can follow in real time the location of the 
ordered driver such that they know when to expect the car to arrive. Payment is 
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handled automatically through the smart phone app at the end of the ride, when 
also customers rate the service publicly with the application.  
 
Impacts to markets are easily seen for instance in the New York: There are 
officially black taxis (limousine and premium for corporate customers), green and 
yellow taxi cabs (midrange, street hailed), and small livery companies for hire 
vehicles, which carry less than 10% of paid trips in Metropolitan New York. Uber 
services and other similar platforms offering ride services (PRS) have disrupted 
the prevalent market segmentation by changing pricing and increasing pre-
arranged rides. As a consequence, the supply has increased, and segments are 
overlapping, thus in general meeting better user needs for transportation.  
 
The new entrants have gained big market shares quickly. Figures vary, but Uber’s 
market share of the US ride-hailing market is between 69% and 74% (Iqbal, 
2018). For instance, in New York PRS now outnumber yellow taxis four to one 
(Wodinsky, 2018).  
 
However, there are several negative impacts as well:  The studies reveal that PRS 
has added billions of miles of driving in the largest metro areas in the US at the 
same time that car ownership grew more rapidly than the population (Schaller, 
2018). Uber taxis actually use more mileage per trip, because they have to pick 
up the customer. And they prefer not to park but to drive around, because 
parking is expensive. Thus, 20-50 percent of miles are without passengers (Law, 
2018). Importantly, PRS actually compete mainly with public transportation, 
walking and biking. In major U.S. cities, the popularity of FHV has “reduced the 
use of buses by 6% and light rail by 3%” (c.f. Law, 2018). Thus, it seems that the 
increased supply has lured people to switch from public transport to taxis making 
limited street space congested. These findings are confirmed in another 
assessment of the effects of uberization in San Francisco; it found that contrary 
to the vision of PRS, it is actually the biggest contributor to growing traffic 
congestion in San Francisco (Erhardt et al, 2019).  
 
In 2018, two years after entry of the PRS, New York decided for limitations (New 
York City, 2016). The license’s duration was shortened to 12 months, driver 
minimum wage and minimum fare price was introduced, number of PRS cars 
cannot grow, but in wheel-chair -accessible category, or where PRS service is in 
short supply (Wodinsky, 2018). Still, the taxi drivers consider not to be part of 
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the deal and there has been recently strikes due to worsening income by drivers 
(Rapier, 2019).  
 
One could also argue that it is a matter of time, when the markets will find the 
right balance between regulatory measures, pricing, demand and supply, but, for 
example Uber has been operating in San Francisco since 2010, and in New York 
since 2011, so the explanation is neither credible, or feasible. Hence there is a 
need for better, more local approaches, such as the one proposed by Ostrom’s 
design principles. 
 
5 Analysis of taxi services in Finland 
 
In Finland, taxi markets have been highly regulated, authorities admitting taxi 
licenses on regional needs basis. However, the authority in charge of regulation, 
Finnish Ministry of traffic and communications, informed in Autumn 2016 that 
taxi business is to be deregulated. The expectation was that deregulation would 
result in more taxis, better service, cheaper prices and more taxable income for 
traffic investments. Since Autumn 2018, there is no more regulation on the 
amount of taxi cars, the taxi licenses are national (instead of regional), official 
requirements on vocational competence and local knowledge are omitted 
(passing a simplified test is sufficient), and pricing is liberated.  
 
The Ministry is following the effects of the deregulation on taxi markets with 
surveys, which form the main data source for our analysis. The Ministry 
anticipated that the main effects are the opening of the taxi business to new 
entrants and boost in innovation in transportation services. This came true: there 
are new entrants and the total number of taxi-licenses grew in Finland: In Feb 
2019, there are 2762 (29%) taxi licenses more on the market (of total 12249 
licenses) than at the end of the regulation in the Summer of 2018. Consequently, 
the taxes paid by taxis should have increased.  However, the most recent statistics 
shows opposite results – the taxes paid by taxis actually decreased by one third 
from the previous three years according to the tax authorities – this discrepancy 
is expected to be due to tax evasion (Konttinen, 2019). 
 
However, a more detailed analysis reveals that the regional differences are 
significant – the increase of licenses takes place in the big cities. Uber is operating 
only in the capital area in Finland. As cities are becoming dominated by 
J. Heikkilä & M. Heikkilä:  
Global service platforms in local markets: case taxi services 889 
 
 
international taxi company subsidiaries, they are turning to oligopolistic leader-
follower pricing: the price of taxi service increased by over 20% in the biggest 
cities. At the same time, sparsely populated areas suffer from increasing lack of 
taxi service, and this is causing severe problems for example to elderly country-
side residents. The complaints about non-profitable business has increased (in 





Figure 1. Taxi markets in Finland 
 
After deregulation, the market changed as depicted in Figure 1. There are now 
clearly several distinctive markets for Taxis in Finland:  
 
1. Business customers and private customers, who can negotiate the price 
when reserving transportation. The market has turned to an oligopolistic 
supplier markets in bigger cities, where a few international taxi companies 
dominate the market share and have been able to raise the price level 
recently. Typical price reduction of negotiating the price at the spot (taxi 
post) is -25% from the list price. On the other hand, during rush hours, 
or late-night hours the price can be many times the list price. In sparsely 
populated areas the situation varies. Small one car-one driver companies 
are not obliged to be on call, which means that the cars are not available 
as before, or at all. Bigger companies have no interest for the 
insignificant market.  
2. School and daycare transportations are allocated through competitive 
biddings by municipalities. The prices are pushed down by combining 
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rides for the elderly and school kids. Typical winners are taxi companies 
of bigger size, who can guarantee regular, daily service. The market 
consists of multiple monopsony-oligopoly structures. 
3. Subsidized KELA-transports1, where a sole client determines a ceiling 
price and saves costs by requiring combined transports with minimum 
number of passengers. On the other hand, taxi centers act as proxies for 
small and big taxi companies and they are inspected by authorities for 
the quality of service. The political pressure for price reduction 
continues. Market has switched from pure monopsony to monopsony-
oligopolistic structure. Half years after deregulation the studies show how 
service level and availability has deteriorated significantly in the special 
customer segment, such as elderly and people with wheel-chair. 
 
In summary, the liberation of taxi markets has not moved towards perfectly 
competitive taxi market, but it has led to the growth of internationally funded big 
fleets of taxi companies, who can utilize the economies of scale. It is now clearly 
oligopolistic markets for private customers, and the previous oligopsonies 
(municipalities and KELA) are facing oligopolies in their negotiations (instead of 
association of taxi drivers). This is in line with the theory predicting tipping and 
unpredictable markets in an uncontrollable manner.  
 
The outcome in densely populated areas is better availability, but lesser 
profitability for taxi drivers, because the big companies were able to exert 
predatory pricing in the beginning and later increasing prices. The prices rose 
+14% in the capital area and +7 % in the whole country. At the same time there 
are some hints for slightly diminishing use of other public transportation like 
buses, trams, trains and metro in bigger cities. However, in sparsely populated 
areas the capacity reduction in taxi services is clear, and in some places,  there are 
no taxi service, as the drivers quitted or sold their companies to big players.  
 
So, there are major problems with service quality, price levels, competitive 
bidding and obviously tax evasion – by the public, the taxi liberation is considered 
a failure, and the differences between market segments is significant. Majority of 
regular customers and subsidized specialty customer groups feel that the effects 
of deregulations are negative (Uusitalo et al., 2019). Hence there is also a need 
                                                     
1 In Finland you can get reimbursement for your travel costs in connection with the treatment of an illness. 
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for alternative, probably market segment specific, more local solutions, as the 
central government is not capable to meet the objectives of the deregulation. One 
attempt for Ostromian solution is explained below. 
 
Local adaptation of deregulated taxi service - ATaxi 
 
We also analyzed in more detail the reactions of one incumbent taxi service 
provider, a taxi drivers’ co-operative ATaxi, which had operated over hundred 
years in Northern Finland. With its high standards ATaxi had created over the 
years locally well-known brand image of quality, credibility and safety. It served 
customers in the rather sparsely populated region with a fleet of 600 cars 
equipped with proprietary technology that enabled the drivers to receive and 
accept orders and accept debit/credit payments among the first in the world. 
Customers could order ATaxi by calling centralized call-center, which forwarded 
request to nearest drivers, the fastest of whom then took the order, previously 
via radio, later via the mobile Internet. In practice, before deregulation, the ATaxi 
had a monopoly position in the local market for almost a century – the situation 
was basically the same in other regions in Finland.  Legal consultants helped 
ATaxi to evaluate the kind of changes they can make, not abusing its significant 
market powers, which ATaxi still possess. ATaxi realized that its competitive 
edge was that it offers reliable, safe, and high-quality taxi services. In order to be 
able to keep this value proposition, the company balanced the number of cars to 
serve the market well and still provide sufficient earnings to the drivers. Thus, 
instead of competing with price, it aggregated regional taxi data and estimated 
the number of taxis required to meet its service proposition. The rules of ATaxi 
membership, including rules for determining the number of drivers were agreed 
and put openly available from their web pages. These rules are revisited 
biannually, or whenever members see it necessary. In addition, the co-operative 
saw as a necessity to introduce new brand, and new channels through which the 
customers can identify, order and interact with the service.  
 
6 Discussion and conclusion 
 
This paper discusses the side effects of platform economy: the unanticipated 
consequences  and indirect externalities. The two identified unexpected effects 
on the community, based on theory and accumulating experiences of platforms 
in taxi business are the overgrazing of common resource pool and unanticipated 
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changes of the market structure. The former is illustrated with an of Uber in the 
U.S., where uberlike platforms’ indirectly diminishes use of public transportation, 
and consequently increase environmental pollution and congestion. The latter 
case is illustrated with taxi services in Finland, where deregulation of taxi services 
changed the market structure significantly and failed to meet the set targets of 
the change. However, a regional taxi company operating in Northern Finland 
designed a local solution for deregulated markets, that was able to maintain the 
present quality of service without deteriorating the income of taxi companies and 
prices.  
 
Next, we discuss the three cases: Uber, Finnish taxi deregulation and the counter-
measures to the deregulation by ATaxi against the backdrop of Ostrom’s Core 
Design Principles for groups capable of avoiding the tragedy of the commons by:  
 
9. Clearly defined boundaries; members know that they belong to a group and why do 
they belong exactly to that group, and what are the limits of the common resource. 
Taxi drivers formed a professional community, and license system set 
geographical limits to the common resources: space and customer base. 
Uber in N.Y.C and deregulation threatened the status quo and served as 
an incentive to limit the overgrazing of street space (N.Y.C).The limited 
customer base of ATaxi in Northern Finland, who nurtured their 
professionalism despite the regulation in a limited geographical area and 
are (so far) able to avoid the complications of changing market structure 
elsewhere in Finland 
10. Proportional equivalence between benefits and costs; there is a connection between 
earnings and effort, e.g., appropriation of rents is not enough. Disruption of the 
market and falling profits (N.Y.C), or threat of future decline (ATaxi) 
created an incentive to re-regulate the market by the community, so that 
the drivers can earn a living from their profession. This actually was the 
boost to renew the rules for ATaxi which returned the balance between 
earning and effort. In metropoles of the U.S. the taxi drivers started 
demonstrating, because of unfair share of income. 
11. Collective choice arrangements; i.e., agreements must be reached in consensus by those 
affected by the agreements. Taxi drivers’ unions were formerly negotiating for 
different markets in N.Y.C (black, green, yellow, livery markets); or 
serving all market segments in Finland (private, business, subsidized 
rides) with obligation to being on call and providing service in sparsely 
J. Heikkilä & M. Heikkilä:  
Global service platforms in local markets: case taxi services 893 
 
 
populated regions. As the markets were deregulated, the consensus 
disappeared. Sparsely populated areas are suffering from no-access to 
taxi services and in N.Y.C., there was no respect to the upper limit of 
taxi cars, which drove the prices down and congested the streets. ATaxi 
maintained the on-call responsibility. 
12. Monitoring users and condition of the resource; Harmful self-interested, self-serving 
behavior can be detected. As the agreed use of common resource could not 
be, or was not allowed to be monitored, due to liberalization of terms of 
conditions, the situation promoted self-interested and self-serving 
behavior. In essence, the negative externalities (for drivers non-sufficient 
wages), and negative indirect externalities (congestion in N.Y.C, lack of 
service in sparsely populated areas, oligopoly price-hikes in densely 
populated areas) could be detected only afterwards, leading to 
unintended consequences. The local communities responded by re-
regulating the market, or by establishing mutual consensus agreements 
and self-monitoring and -reporting by rules (see also 3. and 5.) and 
applications available to the customers, too. However, in Finland there 
is evidence of increasing tax evasion beyond the control of tax office. 
13. Graduated sanctions; Repeated self-serving appropriators are assessed graduated 
sanctions according to seriousness and context of the violation by group members, or 
by officials accountable to these appropriators, or by both. It appears that both the 
platforms (N.Y.C.) and deregulation set centrally strict sanctions for the 
drivers. This differs from the past where sanctions were graduated, 
proportional, and maintained by the community, which is still the case 
with ATaxi.  
14. Fast and fair conflict resolution; Conflicts can be handled without excessive costs, 
locally, and without internal conflicts breaking the group. Disappearance of taxi 
inspectors in Finland has led to situations, in e.g. big events, where there 
is no impartial authority over all taxi drivers for queuing, unloading, etc., 
or reconciliating non-satisfactory service, or pricing has lead to fist fights 
for  customer in waiting areas (TS xxx), which lead to local conciliation 
between taxi companies and municipality. The conflict resolution by the 
authorities is simply too slow and non-proportional demoralizing the 
profession. 
15. Local autonomy; The group is autonomous to manage its own matters without 
external authorities intervening. Platforms and authorities have moved in the 
territory of self-regulated drivers and companies, with un-intended 
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consequences on availability (in restless areas of N.Y.C.; sparsely 
populated areas in Finland), quality of service (subsidized rides in 
Finland), and on pricing (greater Helsinki area in Finland, rush-hours in 
N.Y.C). The central authorities are not able to solve the problems in our 
cases despite their attempts. 
16. Nested enterprises: When the resource is closely connected to a larger social-ecological 
system, governance activities are organized in multiple nested layers. There is an 
indication that ways to enhance the situation is not by redistributing the 
resources (N.Y.C., Cities in Finland), or by pushing for harder 
competition and setting price ceilings in competitive bidding in 
subsidized rides in Finland. Instead, the parties should come together 
and acknowledge the limitations of market mechanisms and utilize 
platforms and re-regulation to give a try the Ostrom Core Design 
Principles to avoid over grazing of common-resources, or distortions on 
the distinct markets. This remains to be seen. 
 
The examples in previous chapters show how the taxi services quality and supply 
increased in big cities, but on the other hand caused overgrazing of common 
resources, the street areas. Therefore, In US the communities were soon forced 
to restrain Uber by establishing new rules regarding number of cars and length 
of license periods. In Finland, the deregulation of the markets in the whole 
country did not work as anticipated by liberators. The emergent properties were 
many and hard to predict. Instead of perfect markets, the market was divided in 
several distinctive markets: the markets in big cities concentrated and is now 
dominated by international players. There are now more taxi cars driving around 
in the cities, but contrary to expectations, the prices rise. In special customer 
segments and sparsely populated areas the quality reduction in service level is 
clear. As a response to the above a local ATaxi community in a limited 
geographical area established rules to balance the number of taxi cars to serve 
the market well and still provide sufficient earnings to the drivers. Ministry is 
currently evaluating impacts of the deregulation in Finland and might be forced 
to take actions similar to New York and set restrictions to the taxi service 
markets, or alternatively, allow the local communities to establish their own rules 
for guaranteeing available, safe, and reliable taxi rides. 
 
In the illustrative cases it becomes evident that there are no simple solutions, but 
the solutions are actually adaptations to the dynamic situations, which are hard 
J. Heikkilä & M. Heikkilä:  
Global service platforms in local markets: case taxi services 895 
 
 
to meet by the standard means of privatization, i.e., by appropriating resources 
and introducing pricing mechanisms, Assuming multi-sided perfectly 
competitive markets is not true in the markets that can vary from monopsonies 
of customers to oligopolies of big taxi companies, or call centers, operating on 
limited common resources in terms of space or population.. This is further 
complicated, if the common pool resources are not taken into account. 
Nevertheless, the avoidance of the tragedy of the comments builds on social 
norms and characteristics of the community and adapting the platforms to their 
situations on an on-going basis.  
 
More sensitive solutions to the situation could be provided by alternative 
approaches such as Ostrom’s Core Design Principles. Combined with the power 
of multisided markets, it could be worth trying to achieve sustainable and better 
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